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The Effects of Early Stage Venture Capitalist Actions
on Eventual Venture Disposition
Lowell W. Busenitz
James O. Fiet

This study examines the relationship between venture capitalist actions and the eventual
disposition of a venture through an IPO, which is the most profitable exit strategy. The
actions included in this study were (1) altering the amount of their investment; (2) secur
ing a concentrated equity position; (3) diversifying their syndicate investments; and (4)
introducing their investees to other sources o f financing. After five years, this study
found a positive relationship between IPO exit and (1) the amount of their investment;
and (2) the diversification o f their VC syndicate. However, it found only mixed results
for (1) venture capitalist concentrated equity position; and (2) introductions to other
sources o f funding. Finally, implications for future research are discussed.

I. INTRODUCTION
Most research on investing in new businesses has concluded that venture capital
ists (VCs) serve a valuable intermediary function (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, &
Vetsuypens, 1990; Lam, 1991; Lemer, 1994; Mull, 1994; Norton, 1993) by creat
ing more rewarding financial outcomes for their investee ventures and ultimately
for themselves. Although there has been much discussion about how VCs should
invest (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994; Chan, 1983), how to implement various con
tracting technologies (Barney, Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 1994; Barry, 1994;), and
where they should attempt to add value (MacMillan, Kulow, & Khoylian 1989;
Sapienza, 1992), many questions remain unanswered. This paper contributes to
this discussion by asking: “Do early-stage venture capitalist actions impact a VC’s
prospects for profitably exiting a venture?”
VC value-added research can be divided into two tracks. One track has
emphasized the value VCs can add by providing operational and strategic advice
(MacMillan, Kulow, & Khoylian, 1989; Barney, Busenitz, Fiet & Moesel, 1996),
assisting with the recruitment and dismissal of key managers (Fiet, Busenitz, Moe
sel & Barney, in press; Rosenstein, Bruno, Bygrave, & Taylor, 1993; Wame,
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1988), and helping entrepreneurs to make contacts with critical suppliers and cus
tomers (Sapienza, 1992). Furthermore, VC involvement with a venture’s manage
ment can reduce the riskiness of cash flows by alerting them about possible sources
of concern (Gompers, 1995). The majority of this work has tested hypotheses uti
lizing cross-sectional data collection. A second research track has compared VCbacked and non-VC-backed firms, specifically focusing on VC contributions to
gains in performance (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994; Barry et al., 1990; Chan, 1983;
Lam, 1991; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Mull, 1994). The central findings from this
track have been that VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms (Mull,
1994); the retention of VC equity after the initial public stock offering (IPO) seems
to be favorably perceived by financial markets (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994); larger
VC equity positions are also favorably perceived (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994); and
VCs provide an important link to other sources of financing (Lam, 1991).
Findings from this second stream are largely based on research from firms that
have sold their shares in a pubUc offering. ^Researchers have selected these pubhcly
traded firms because prior studies suggest that this type of disposition has been the
most profitable for VCs and because it can serve as a proxy for a high level of per
formance (Gladstone, 1989; Lam, 1991).^ The availabihty of data for these IPO
firms is another reason for their frequent examination (Barry, 1994). Unfortunately,
hmiting inquiry to only IPO firms constrains the reUability of these findings because
it tends to over-sample successful ventures, to bypass the investigation of causality
by ignoring appropriate control variables, and to leave many unanswered questions
about the impact of early stage VC activities on long-term venture performance.
VCs work closely with their investees during the early stages of their relation
ship because they beUeve that their input is vital (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989).
Moreover, it may be that it is in this earlier period when VCs can make the most
important impact on venture performance (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Despite
their likely importance, no known studies have examined the effects of early stage
VC actions on a VC’s prospects for an IPO exit. Instead, they have sampled con
comitant VC activities in the post-IPO era when less variance in performance from
the effects of VC involvement would be expected.
The plan for this paper is as follows. Section II develops the theory and
hypotheses for four different VC actions. Section HI presents the research method
ology. Section IV presents the data analysis showing the effects of VC actions on
the probabiUty of an IPO exit. The conclusions and research implications are pre
sented in Section V.
II. THE EFFECT OF EARLY STAGE VC ACTIONS ON IPO EXIT
The early stage VC actions examined by this paper include:^ ( 1 ) the amount of the
investment made by VCs in each syndicate (cf., Lam, 1991; Lemer, 1994); (2) the
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impact of majority VC ownership (cf, Holdemess & Sheehan, 1988); (3) the diver
sification of VC syndicates (cf., Barry et al., 1990); and (4) VC introductions to
other sources of financing (cf., Lam, 1991). Although these VC actions have been
examined by other researchers, no one else known to us has tracked their impact
over time on the eventual profitable disposition of a venture. Because IPO disposi
tion has been shown to be the most profitable way to exit a venture (Gladstone,
1989; Lam, 1991), the effects of these antecedents on IPO exits are central to this
research.
The Amount of First Round Investment
Investing in new ventures, particularly ones that are based on new technology,
is inherently risky. These businesses have no track record, no established markets,
and sometimes require substantial investment in order to survive. Moreover, they
frequently face competitive uncertainties with no guarantee that they will be able
to respond to the forays of rivals, nor anticipate market opportunities (Norton,
1993). One reason for the riskiness of new ventures is that it is very difficult to
anticipate which technology will be selected by buyers and if a business guesses
wrong, any investments in alternative technologies could have little or no eventual
value (Chan, 1983).
One way to reduce the risk of investing in new businesses is to acquire riskreducing information before making the investment. The most valuable type of
risk-reducing information is specific information about people, places, special
relationships, or timing—^in other words—^factors that are usually relevant to one
particular investment opportunity (Fiet, in press; Hayek, 1945). Although there are
a number of ways to acquire specific information, some of which are less costly
than others, there are few other ways to reduce a venture’s riskiness other than to
be lucky.
This recognition of the risk-reducing role of specific information is somewhat
different from the generally accepted view that the way to reduce a VC’s risk is to
stage investments in the business. With staged financing, if something goes wrong,
a VC can abandon its investment and “stage” a hasty exit (Sahlman, 1990). Staging
their investments is a way of hedging their bets on the venture. However, once a
VC possesses specific, risk-reducing information about a venture, we suspect that
they then place a larger bet on a particular business. Thus, we propose that the
amount of first round investment would proxy for a venture’s investments in spe
cific risk-reducing information, which would ultimately serve as a much more
effective avenue for IPO exit.
HIA: The amount of first round VC funding will be positively related to the
occurrence of an IPO exit.
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VC Equity Concentration
VCs frequently prefer concentrated equity positions and play a key role in
important venture decisions (Barry et al., 1990). Concentrated equity positions in
this study refer to those with more than half of the venture equity owned by VCs.
We argue here that VC equity concentration ought to be positively related to a suc
cessful IPO exit. We base our argument on findings from the literature on enter
prise governance which suggest that high ownership concentration can increase
the value of public firms (cf., Smith, 1986; Wruck, 1989). More recently, Fiet et al.
(in press) argued in their study of the dismissal of venture team members that
higher levels of ownership concentration could increase a VC’s power to act uni
laterally as a member of the board of directors.
If VCs improve their prospects of an IPO exit by sometimes acting unilater
ally, they would either have to be luckier or better informed in order to make supe
rior judgments about a venture’s prospects than its managers. Because VCs are not
known to be any luckier, to perform better they would have to be better informed.
This is consistent with earlier research that has argued that VC participation in
multiple ventures make them more informed decision makers on critical decisions
(Barry, 1994). Thus we argue that a concentrated equity position may empower
VCs to act unilaterally, which could result in more IPO exits, assuming that they
were better informed.
HIB: VCs holding a majority of the equity of the venture after round one
funding will be positively related to an IPO exit.
VC Syndicate Diversification
Venture capitalists frequently diversify their investments through the use of
limited-hability investor syndicates (Bygrave, 1987).'^ Diversification entails
investing in multiple businesses as a way of hedging against losses in a single busi
ness. Although syndication is commonly seen as valuable for reducing venture
specific risk (Norton, 1993), this study concerns itself with the impact VC syndi
cations have on venture firms. We predict that increased VC syndication will be
positively related to long-term venture outcome. Our arguments are based on two
assumptions that we explain next.
First, a more diverse syndicate may reflect a superior selection process of
investments. Building on decision making theory using polyarchies,^ Lemer
(1994) argued that upon discovering a venture potentially worthy of investment,
the VC typically forwards a proposal to other investors for their review. The will
ingness of other VCs to invest in the firm may be an important factor in the lead
VC’s decision to invest. In other words, syndication provides VCs with an oppor
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tunity to compare their thinking with that from other respected sources of advice
and information. Thus, larger VC syndicates may reflect a superior selection of
investments based on them possessing superior information.
Second, participation in a syndicate may also provide long-term benefits
because it can draw upon the expertise of multiple VCs. A larger number of inves
tors in a specific syndicate are likely to jointly provide better resources and incen
tives to effectively monitor a venture’s performance (Barry et al, 1990). Thus,
larger syndicates are likely to do a better job monitoring a venture’s management
team (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Increased monitoring effectiveness can lower
the uncertainty associated with a venture’s managers acting in either a self-interested or incompetent manner (Norton, 1993). Multiple evaluators who have spe
cialized in market risk may also forestall losses due to incorrect evaluations of
competitive conditions (cf., Fiet, 1995a; 1995b). These arguments lead to the fol
lowing hypothesis:
H lC: The investment diversification of the VC syndicate during round one
funding will be positively related to long-term venture performance,
as indicated by an IPO exit from the business.
Early Stage Introductions to Other Sources of Financing
In order for a VC to benefit from a profitable IPO, it often must be willing to
endure diminished periods of venture growth. During periods of slow growth VCs
may help by introducing their investees to other sources of financing. In the postIPO era, VC involvement has been shown to be particularly useful in increasing
the market’s valuation of a venture when VCs maintain a large equity stake (Lam,
1991). Barry et al. (1990) also argued that when VCs choose to invest (or stay
invested), they send a clear signal regarding a venture’s quality, which in tum
influences external valuations. Because the evaluation of a venture’s performance
is complex, outside investors may substitute the presumed positive evaluations of
the VC(s) for their own incomplete evaluations.^ Clear signaling may reduce the
risk of investing in new ventures by providing information about risk factors. The
involvement of VCs may be an effective proxy for other outside assessments of
venture stability and value.
Even if a VC chooses to minimize its financial support of developmental or
operational expenses, it will generally be in its long-term interest to ensure that a
venture’s managers succeed in securing financing for these essential purposes.
One way VCs can support their investees is to introduce them to third party sources
of financing. Although we are unaware of any prior test of this hypothesis in the
earlier stages of VC financing, we suspect that introductions to other investors
would be positively related to the eventual IPO disposition of the venture.
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Introductions of their investees by venture capitalists to other sources
of financing will be positively related to the long-term performance of
the venture, as indicated by an IPO exit from the business.
III.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Independent Variables

We collected data for the independent variables by surveying ventures that had
received at least one round of venture capital funding. Eight hundred thirty-seven
ventures were identified in the 1987-1989 editions of Venture Capital Journal.
Using Dillman’s (1978) Total Design Method, which is an approach that incorpo
rates four rounds of subject contacts, we generated responses from 235 firms, for a
response rate of twenty-eight percent.
Thirty of these firms indicated that their financing was used for either seed
money or a leveraged buy-out.^ After deleting firms receiving either seed money
or financing for a leveraged buy out, we compiled a final sample of 205 firms.
We also compiled data on VC-funded ventures and their stage of financing.
We obtained this information from the Venture Capital Journal to check for pos
sible response biases, which were not found.*
We computed the amount invested per VC investor by dividing the total
amount of first round funding by the number of VCs in the syndicate.
We computed VC syndicate diversification as follows:^
lljm if
VC syndicate diversification = 1 -

(Zjmij)^

where “7 ” equals the number of VCs in the syndicate and “mif’ equals the percent
age of total first round investment in venture firm “i” made by VC firm “/”. The
denominator was added as an adjustment to the original measure to acconmiodate
the use of VC investment data not summing to one. By way of example, these cal
culations resulted in a score of “0” if only one VC contributed to round one fund
ing, a score of “0.50” if two VCs invested equally, a score of “0.667” if three VCs
invested equally, etc. The scores for our study ranged from 0.0 to 0.829.
We measured VC equity ownership using a survey question that asked the
entrepreneur, “After first round financing, what percentage of [your venture’s] out
standing shares were held by venture capital firms?” We then collapsed the VC
equity ownership variable into a majority VC equity ownership variable by coding
it as a “1” if a VC syndicate obtained more than fifty percent ownership during first
round financing. All other observations were coded as “0.” Upon completion of
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first round financing, fifty-four percent of the VC syndicates held majority owner
ship positions.
We measured new financing sources using a single item, 5-point Likert scale
ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). The item asked if
“Our VCs introduce us to other sources of financing”.
Dependent Variable
Venture disposition data was collected during 1995. The status of each VCbacked venture was categorized as follows: ( 1 ) no longer in business; (2 ) ''living
dead' (private and/or marginally profitable); (3) merged or acquired; and (4) IPOs
(pubUcly traded and/or initial public offerings).^®
We located data on each of these four types of venture disposition by search
ing the following sources: Compact Disclosure, Million Dollar Directory, Ward’s
Business Directory, CorpTech Directory, Mergers and Acquisitions Journal, and
F&S Predicast. If we could not determine a venture’s disposition from these
sources, we contacted its VC by fax or telephone to inquire. These procedures suc
cessfully classified 196 out of 205 firms that had received first round funding.^ *
Control Variables
There are other factors that could influence how a VC exits from a venture in
addition to those for which we have hypothesized effects. We controlled for the
effects of the most prominent of these factors mentioned in the literature, which
included (1) year of first round funding', (2 ) industry competitiveness', (3) techno
logical differentiation', (4) specific resource endowments', and (5) size of the venture.
We included the year offirst roundfunding because it takes time for a venture
to mature and to develop a market for its products or services. Because the time since
first round funding varied among the ventures in our sample, it was necessary to con
trol for the potential impact of this age-related factor of going through an IPO.
If we accept the proposition that industry structure dictates the range of
acceptable strategies available to a venture, which determines its performance or
type of disposition (cf. Bain, 1968; Mason, 1939; Porter, 1980), it is crucial to
assess the structural attractiveness of a venture’s industry. An industry is structur
ally attractive when the actions of a single competitor do not affect the profits of
other industry firms. We measured industry attractiveness on 5-point Likert scales
(strongly agree as “1” to strongly disagree as “5”) using six items suggested by
Porter (1980). These items were: (1) “Essential materials for our products are hard
to obtain” [supplier power]; (2) “Our products/services meet important customer
needs” [customer power]; (3) “Many products/services comparable to ours are
available” [substitutability]; (4) “Demand for our product does not fluctuate”
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[rivalry]; (5) “Other firms may start offering similar products” [threat of entry];
and (6 ) “Entry into our market by new firms is not difficult” [threat of entry]. We
summed the responses to create a composite score of industry attractiveness.^^
A venture that is vulnerable to competitive pressures often attempts to protect
itself by pursuing unique strategies. One commonly used strategy is that of techno
logical differentiation (Gomez-Mejia, Balkin, & Welboume, 1990). A venture
pursuing such a strategy attempts to attract customers by offering innovative fea
tures that are better than those of its competitors. The effect of this type of a barrier
is that it raises the cost that potential entrants must incur to successfully pose a
competitive threat. We measured technological differentiation using three 5-point
Likert scales ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). We uti
lized the following items to collect data on three scales: (1) “Our products/services
have many unique features;” (2) “Our products/services are not protected by pat
ents;” and (3) “We utilize R&D to differentiate our products.” The Cronbach’s
alpha for this scale was acceptable (a = 0.725).
The most valuable resources upon which to base a strategy intended to create
a sustainable competitive advantage are those for which there are no equivalent
uses for them outside of the venture (cf., Hayek, 1945). If a resource were com
monly available, others could inexpensively utilize it to duplicate a venture’s strat
egy. Not only would duplication ruin a strategy’s capacity to sustain a competitive
advantage, but it would also result at best in normal economic returns. The most
valuable types of resources are those which are specific to the venture.
Specific venture resource endowments are those related to particular people,
places, timing, or special circumstances affecting the venture, which if shifted to
another venture would be much less valuable in this alternative use (cf., Hayek,
1945). We attempted to tap this construct in three ways. First, we asked if any one
on the venture’s management team had any previous startup experience with a
venture that was at least partially funded by VCs.” This variable was coded as a
“0” or as a “1” with “1” equaling previous startup experience with VC backing.
Second, we tapped the specificity of a venture’s human capital by asking,
“How easy would it be for key managers in your company to apply the same man
agerial skills in other organizations?” and “How easy would it be for key managers
in your company to apply the same technical/engineering skills in other organiza
tions?” Responses to these ranged from “easily transferable,” “most could easily
be transferred,” ’’some could easily be transferred,” to “none could be easily trans
ferred (coded one to four respectively). These items were then summed and aver
aged with resulting scores ranging from 1 . 0 to 3 .5 .
Some researchers have found evidence that the “top” VC firms may add more
value than others (Barry et al., 1990; Rosenstein et al., 1993). Bygrave (1987)
noted that thirteen percent of the sixty-one VC firms in his sample managed fiftyseven percent of the total pool of venture capital. Because the “top” classification
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used by other researchers was apparently a qualitative scheme, we were unable to
utilize it d irectly .W e followed Bygrave’s pattern and categorized thirteen per
cent of VC firms identified by our sampled entrepreneurs as “top” VC firms, which
we ranked according to the amount of their investments.^'^ We determined the size
of their investment portfolios by referring to the 1990 Pratt’s Guide to Venture
Capital Sources. Those VC firms managing more than $200 million (the top thir
teen percent) were coded as “ 1 ” and the rest “0 ”.
IV. LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF EARLY-STAGE VC ACTIONS
Table 1 describes the impact of four early-stage VC actions on four types of ven
ture disposition, one of which is an IPO exit. In regard to hypothesis lA, the still
private group received the lowest average funding amount (Column 2 ), whereas
the IPO group (Column 4) received the highest. The mean of $0.88 million
Table 1
The Impact of Early-Stage VC Actions on
Four Different Types of Venture Disposition
Long-Term Venture Firm Status

Hypothesis lA;
Mean Amount Invested per Investor ($ mil)
Hypothesis IB:
Mean VC Equity Percentage
Percentage of firms with VC Majority
Ownership
Hypothesis 1C:
Mean VC syndicate diversification index
Mean Number of First Round Investors'^
Hypothesis 2:
Mean VC Introductions to
Other Funding Sources

1
Out o f
Business

2
Still
Private

3
Merged or
Acquired

4“
IPO

0.88
(0.70)

0.77
(0.54)

0.91
(0.48)

0.98
(0.71)'’

0.57
(0.19)
0.71
(0.45)

0.49
(0.23)
0.45
(0.50)

0.55
(0.23)
0.61
(0.51)

0.52
(0.17)
0.55
(0.50)

0.53
(0.29)
2.96
(1.94)

0.42
(0.30)
2.76
(1.67)

0.53
(0.28)
2.83
(1.78)

0.63
(0.23)
3.65
(1.91)

3.06
(0.89)

3.66
(0.95)

5.50
(0.99)

4.00
(0.91)

Notes: ^The number o f observations in each category are as follows: Out o f Business = 28; Still Private = 82;
Merged or Acquired = 23; IPO = 56.
^The standard deviations are in parentheses.
^ e concentration index was utilized in this study, but the mean number of first round investors is
reported here for comparison with prior studies.
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invested per investor (see Table 2) is also substantially higher than the $0.5 million
reported by Lemer (1994) in his study of biotechnology firms between the years of
1978 and 1989. Table 1 also reports data on the percent of equity held by VCs after
their first round funding (hypothesis IB). It is interesting to note that the highest
percentage category of majority VC equity control was for the “out of business”
group. Perhaps these were high risk ventures that ultimately failed.
ITiese data further confirm that syndication (hypothesis 1C) is a conmion, and
possibly, an increasing component of first round funding (2.96 VC investors per
first round investment). Lemer (1994) reported a mean of 2.2 VC investors for first
round funding. Only 20 percent of the venture firms in this sample had a single VC
investor for first round financing. The data on VC introductions to other funding
sources (hypothesis 2 ) shows some modest variation with the merged or acquired
group receiving the lowest score and the IPO class receiving the highest.
Because the dependent variable, long-term venture disposition is a categorical
variable with four reasonably distinct classifications (out of business, still private,
merged or acquired, and IPO), a multinomial logit model was developed for fur
ther analysis. This statistical technique allows for the testing of a generalized logit
along with multiple logits per subpopulation (Stokes, Davis & Koch 1995). The
multinomial logistic regression model is an extension of the dichotomous logistic
model (Menard, 1995). This statistical technique allows for the comparison of a
reference class (IPOs) to the other dependent variable classifications.
The means, standard deviations, and correlations among all variables are pre
sented in Table 2. As Table 2 indicates, multicollinearity does not appear to be a
significant problem among our independent variables.
Table 3 utilizes two panels to report the results of the multinomial logistic
analysis. Panel A contains the Wald chi-square analysis for the overall effect of
each independent variable in our model. These test are analogous to those found in
a conventional ANOVA table for a balanced ANOVA design after controlling for
all other effects. Panel B contains an analysis of maximum-likelihood estimates,
which gives the coefficient estimates for each variable in the model. The three
individual logits reported in Panel B compare the reference class (firms that have
been through an IPO in this study) with each of the other three categories (out of
business, still private, and merged or acquired).
First Round VC Investment
The Wald Chi-square statistics for the overall effects of the various indepen
dent variables are shown in Panel A of Table 3. After controlling for the factors
specified in Section H above, it is apparent that the average amount invested infirst
round financing significantly impacts venture dispositions. For each type of ven
ture exit the Chi-square statistic indicates that the amount of investment made as a
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Table 3
Multinominal Logit Model with VC Investment Behaviors
Panel A: Wald chi-square test on parameters across all venture outcomes
Parameter
HIA: First round VC investment
HIB: VC equity concentration
HlC: VC syndicate concentration
H2: New financing sources
Control Variables
Year of first round funding
Industry competitiveness
Technology differentiation strategy
Previous startup experience
Venture specific resources
Top VC firms
-2 log likelihood ratio for covariates

DOF

Wald
Chi-Square

3
3
3
3

7.62’’
l.TA^
11.32^
4.07

3
3
3
3
3
3
10

9.70*’
2.64
9.40'’
3.91
5.58
2.67
85.7“

Panel B: Logit Models with VC Investment Behaviors: IPOs as reference class
Parameter
Choice group: Out of Business (22 Ventures)
HIA: First Round VC Investment
HIB: VC Equity Concentration
HlC: VC Syndicate Concentration
H2: New Financing Sources
Control Variables:
Year of First Round Funding
Industry Competitiveness
Technology Differentiation. Strategy
Previous Startup Experience
Venture Specific Resources
Top VC Firms

Estimate

S.E.

Chi-Square

6.32e-7
0.48
2.99
0.24

4.89e-7
0.32
1.39
0.33

1.67
2.27
4.61*’
0.53

0.19
0.11
0.36
0.29
0.45
0.66

2.11
2.12
2.67<=
0.46
5.40**
0.77

-0.27
0.16
0.58
-0.19
-1.05
0.58

Choice group: Still Private Businesses (74 Ventures)
HIA: First Round VC Investment
1.21e-7
HIB: VC Equity Concentration
-0.12
HlC: VC Syndicate Concentration
3.91
H2: New Financing Sources
0.17
Control Variables:
Year of First Round Funding
-0.31
Industry Competitiveness
0.11
Technology Differentiation. Strategy
0.89
Previous Startup Experience
-0.31
Venture Specific Resources
-0.44
Top VC Firms
0.43

4.39e-7
0.24
1.2
0.26
0.15
0.09
0.29
0.23
0.37
0.51

7.54®
0.26
10.66®
0.43
4.35'’
1.46
9.29®
2.37
1.41
0.71
{continued)
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Table 3
Continued
Parameter

Estimate

S.E.

Chi-Square

Choice group: Merged or Acquired (18 Ventures)
HIA: First Round VC Investment
HIB: VC Equity Concentration
HlC: VC Syndicate Concentration
H2: New Financing Sources

8.22e-7
0.52
2.29
0.63

6.22e-7
0.34
1.53
0.32

1.75
2.36
2.22
3.87'’

0.17
0.12
0.38
0.32
0.48
0.81

0.88
0.08
1.91
3.09^
1.69
2.41

Control Variables;
Year of First Round Funding
Industry Competitiveness
Technology Differentiation. Strategy
Previous Startup Experience
Venture Specific Resources
Top VC Firms

0.16
0.03
0.53
-0.56
-0.62
1.25

Notes: The dependent variable is a qualitative variable with one equaling the venture is now out of business; two
equaling the venture is still private; three equaling the venture has been merged or acquired; and four
equaling the venture has gone through an IPO.
^Different from zero at the one percent level o f significance.
*^Different from zero at the five percent level of significance.
^Different from zero at the ten percent level o f significance.

part of &st round financing does vary significantly. An examination of Table 1
indicates that the average investment was lowest for ventures that are still private
and it was highest for firms that have gone through an IPO.
Panel B of Table 3 contains specific logits comparing the IPO category (54
firms) as the reference class with each of the other three categories (out of business,
still private, and merged or acquired). It also contains maximum-likelihood esti
mates of the model parameters, as well as the parameter estimates themselves. In
addition, it reports that the average amount invested per VC is positively related to
IPO disposition. The relationship is strongest and statistically significant in the
specific logit comparing the ventures that are still private with those that have gone
through an IPO.
VC Equity Concentration
The overall Wald Chi-square test for majority VC equity ownership (Table 3,
Panel A) is marginally significant at the .10 level. The greatest contrast is between
the out-of-business and still private groups. After controlling for the other effects,
there are differences in venture status based on concentrated equity positions. Con
centrated VC equity positions are most prevalent among those ventures that have
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gone out of business (Table 1). None of the specific logits which use IPOs as a ref
erence group (Table 3, Panel B) were statistically significant.
VC Syndicate Diversification
The Wald Chi-square statistic for the overall effect of VC syndicate diversifi
cation is statistically significant at the .01 level (Table 3, Panel A). The more VCs
co-invest in a syndicate, the greater is their impact on a venture’s eventual dispo
sition. The specific logits (Table 3, Panel B) indicate that VC syndicate diversifi
cation is positively related to IPO exit. Furthermore, this relationship is statistically
significant in the out-of-business/IPO and still private/IPO logits. These data indi
cate that greater investment diversification within a VC syndicate increases the
probability that a venture will go public.
There are at least two explanations for this finding. First, it may be that the
more VCs involve themselves in the first round investment selection process, the
greater is the likelihood that the ventures with the greatest potential wiU be
selected. When VCs work together in a syndicate, their combined efforts enable
them to evaluate more specific information about a venture’s prospects, and thus
more accurately predict its future. Second, before VCs invest in ventures via syn
dicates, they forward prospective deals to other investors for their evaluation. The
acceptance of an invitation by other investors to join the syndicate is probably an
important factor in the lead VC’s final decision to invest (Lemer, 1994).
VC Introductions to Other Sources of Financing
The VC literature has frequently noted that VC funding adds substantial cred
ibility to entrepreneurial ventures when they attempt to obtain additional investors
and other types of financing. Most testing of this hypothesis has occurred in the
post-IPO era. This study examined early VC introductions to other sources of
financing. The overall Wald Chi-square statistic was not significant although the
specific logit for the merged or acquired versus IPO logit was significant at the. 10
level and the variable is consistently positive as shown in Panel B of Table 3. VCs
that introduce their investees to other sources of supplemental financing are some
what more likely to go pubUc versus being merged or acquired by another firm.
V. CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
The relationship between VCs and their investees continues to capture the atten
tion of researchers, practitioners, and outside observers. Prior research has gener
ally examined their relationship either in the early stages of the venture with a
cross-sectional design or it has compared VC-backed versus non-VC-backed ven-
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tures in the post IPO era. In contrast, this study uses a longitudinal design to
explore if VC investment behavior during the first round financing is significantly
related to IPO exit after five years. This analysis provides evidence that these
early-stage investment strategies are related to IPO exit after five years.
One of this study’s most important findings is that greater VC investments in
the first round tend to increase the probability that the venture will go public or be
merged or acquired. We argued in Section II that when VCs possess greater
amounts of specific information about an investee firm that they are more willing
to coirunit themselves to higher levels of funding.
Much attention has been given to how VCs stage their investments in order
incrementally to explore risk and to increase monitoring effectiveness. Although
these may be benefits of a staged approach, staging may also limit a venture’s
growth by restricting the amount of specific, risk-reducing information available to
the venture team to make strategic decisions (Fiet, 1995b). Future research should
further examine this phenomenon and also explore the possible down-side to
investing in specific information, which is that it may become a sunk cost with lit
tle or no value in future investments.
Another finding from this study is that when VCs diversify their investments,
individual ventures in their portfolio have a significantly better probability of an
IPO exit. This finding is consistent with Lemer’s (1994) assertion that VCs prefer
investing in syndicates as a way of comparing their own thinking with that of other
potential VC investors. Other VCs’ willingness to invest in a venture may be an
important factor in a lead venture investor’s decision to invest. Larger syndicates
have access to more comprehensive investments in specific information about par
ticular ventures, which could improve the venture selection process. Larger syndi
cates are also likely to bring together more expertise, support, and the availability
of capital for current and follow-on cash needs. If one VC looses confidence in a
venture’s future or if it needs to cash out a fund to satisfy co-investors in another
deal, then remaining VCs in the syndicate may be willing to provide additional
capital. Future research should examine which of these two arguments make the
largest contribution to an eventual IPO disposition.
This study examined the effect on IPO exit of a few different VC actions that
could be initiated by VC syndicates. Future research could examine the effects on
IPO exit of larger ventures versus smaller ventures and older ventures versus
younger ventures within each syndicate, diversity of actual investments made by
VC syndicates and their important impact on venture development. Lemer (1994)
found that the more established VC firms tended to syndicate with one another in
the first found and then include more diverse VCs in later rounds.
Finally, this study found little to support the value of VC introductions to
additional sources of financing. One limitation of this test is that data were
obtained for most firms soon after they received first round financing. Future
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research should investigate this phenomenon after a venture has received a couple
of rounds of VC funding.
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NOTES
1. In 1989, Gladstone described six ways that a VC can exit from a venture: (1) sale of the com
pany’s stock in an IPO; (2) sale of the company’s stock to another company; (3) repurchase of
the VC’s stock by the company itself; (4) sale of the stock to another investor; (5) reorganiza
tion of the company; and (6) liquidation of the company. Because an IPO overcomes the detri
mental effect of small numbers bargaining (cf., Williamson, 1975), it is widely believed to be
the most profitable of these exit strategies.
2. Lam (1991) found that even if a VC is required to maintain a stake in the venture after the IPO,
“part of the risk premium will dissipate after a public offering as information about firm value
increases. This is to say that for a given fiindamental value of a firm, an investor can realize a
higher return if he divests his investment after the firm has gone public” (p. 148).
3. Others have examined whether their advice has a positive impact on venture performance (Bar
ney, Busenitz, Fiet & Moesel, 1994, Sapienza, 1992).
4. A syndicate often takes the form of a limited partnership. A lead VC assumes the role of the
general partners with other co-investing VCs acting as limited partners.
5. Sah and Stiglitz (1986) defined polyarchies as project decisions that were made in the affirma
tive only if two reviewers agree that the project is worth pursuing.
6. This argument is similar to the one made by Williamson (1975) about economies of internal
capital markets and the increased efficiency of risk evaluation that is available to inside inves
tors compared with those on the outside.
7. Responses from these 30 firms were not analyzed for this research project because it examines
VC advice that was provided after first round funding.
8. No significant differences were found between respondents and non-respondents with regard to
the amount of funding reported by VCs [F(l, 688) = 1.53; /? = .22] nor by the stage of ftinding
(X^ (5, N = 779) = 7.672; p = . 17).
9. This measure is similar to the Herfindahl measure of industry concentration and corporate
diversification.
10. There were 30 no longer in business ventures, 84 living dead ventures, 24 merged or acquired
ventures, and 58 IPO ventures in the sample.
11. Nine firms remained that could not be classified. We suspect that these firms are no longer in
business. They were omitted from this study.
12. As expected, the Cronbach’s alpha was low (0.32) because these indicators are taping into five
different aspects of industry attractiveness. Given that they can not be reliably scaled using a
single composite scale, the appropriate thing to do would have been to include them in the mul
tinomial logistic regression equation as separate aspects of industry attractiveness. Unfortu-
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nately, the statistical model lacked sufficient degrees of freedom to accommodate their separate
inclusion. We concluded that the popularity of these indicators in the literature justifies them
being used as a scale. This would be a more serious limitation of this study if they were depen
dent variables instead of being used as control variables. We could have omitted them alto
gether, but in our view there is sufficient theoretical justification for including them.
13. Numerous inquiries to those who utilized this “top” terminology failed to uncover a quantitative
basis for their classification scheme. Although a qualitative scheme was appropriate for their
purposes, we needed to convert it into a quantitative classification system.
14. In those cases where two VCs invested the same amount, the first VC mentioned was desig
nated as the “top" VC.
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